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Comment 
MORSE V. FREDERICK:   
STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
RESTRICTED AGAIN† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In most circumstances, the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution allows individuals to express themselves through their 
speech without fear of punishment.1  However, the First Amendment has 
provided little protection to students in public schools.  Although the 
first United States Supreme Court decision involving student speech and 
the First Amendment, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District,2 seemed to protect students’ freedom of speech rights, two 
Supreme Court decisions following Tinker significantly restricted these 
rights.3  In these cases, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser and 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court created exceptions to the 
standard established in Tinker, thereby allowing for greater censorship of 
student speech and unsettling this area of First Amendment 
jurisprudence. Then, in 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Morse v. Frederick to determine whether it should create another 
exception to Tinker by allowing schools to restrict student speech when 
such speech promotes illegal drug use. 
Part II of this Comment first lays out the facts in Frederick.  Part III 
then examines student speech jurisprudence, focusing on the three major 
Supreme Court decisions involving student speech:  Tinker, Fraser, and 
Kuhlmeier.  Part IV analyzes the appropriateness of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Frederick despite the opinion’s flaws and the possible 
extended interpretations it created. 
                                                 
†  Winner of the 2008 Valparaiso University Law Review Case Comment Competition. 
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment states as follows:  “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  Id. 
2 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
3 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (allowing a school to 
restrict student speech in its school sponsored newspaper); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (allowing a school to restrict lewd student speech during a 
school assembly). 
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II.  THE FACTS IN MORSE V. FREDERICK 
On January 24, 2002, Deborah Morse (“Morse”), the principal of 
Juneau-Douglas High School (“JDHS”) in Juneau, Alaska, permitted 
students to leave class to observe the Olympic Torch Relay as it passed 
on the streets near the school by classifying the activity as a social event 
or class trip.4  As camera crews and torchbearers passed the school, 
Joseph Frederick (“Frederick”), a senior at JDHS who had been watching 
the activities from across the street of the school, and a group of his 
friends displayed a large, fourteen-foot banner, which read “BONG HiTS 
4 JESUS.”5  Because this banner was easily visible from the other side of 
the street, Principal Morse crossed the street and insisted that the 
students take the banner down because she believed its message 
promoted illegal drug use, thereby violating school policy.6  Frederick 
refused to comply with Principal Morse’s request and was suspended for 
ten days; the superintendent later reduced the suspension to the eight 
days that Frederick had already served.7 
Frederick then filed suit against both Principal Morse and the school 
board under 42 U.S.C. § 19838 alleging a violation of his First 
Amendment9 rights and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, 
unspecified compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s 
fees.10  The District Court granted summary judgment for Morse and the 
school board.11  However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
                                                 
4 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 2622–23.  The Juneau School Board Policy No. 5520 stated, “The Board 
specifically prohibits any assembly or public expression that . . . advocates the use of 
substances that are illegal to minors[.]”  Id. at 2623.  In addition, Juneau School Board Policy 
No. 5850 subjected “[p]upils who participate in approved social events and class trips to 
the same student conduct rules that apply during the regular school program.”  Id. 
7 Id. at 2623. 
8 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stating: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought 
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's 
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 
Id. 
9 See supra note 1 (quoting language of the First Amendment). 
10 Frederick, 127 S. Ct. at 2623. 
11 Id. 
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reversed and found that the school board had violated Frederick’s First 
Amendment rights.12  Morse and the school board appealed, and the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.13 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND OF MORSE V. FREDERICK 
Prior to its decision in Frederick, the Court had decided only three 
major cases addressing freedom of speech in public schools.  The first of 
these, decided in 1969, was Tinker.14  In Tinker, students were suspended 
for refusing to remove the black armbands that they wore to show their 
disapproval of the Vietnam War.15  The Tinker Court held that the 
symbolic act of wearing the armbands was protected speech under the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.16  In reaching its decision, 
the Court reasoned that the school could limit student speech only if it 
could prove that the speech would “materially and substantially 
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation 
of the school,” and not simply because the school desired to avoid the 
discomfort attached to the speech.17  The Court decided that students do 
not lose their constitutional rights to freedom of speech and expression 
just because they are at school.18  As a result, the standard the Tinker 
Court created for determining when student speech could be censored 
seemed to ensure the protection of these very important rights. 
Although Tinker attempted to protect the freedom of speech and 
expression rights of students, the Court restricted these rights in 1986 in 
Fraser.19  In Fraser, a high school student, Matthew Fraser (“Fraser”), 
used an explicit sexual metaphor in a speech he gave during a school 
assembly.20  The Fraser Court held that the school did not violate Fraser’s 
First Amendment rights by punishing him for his lewd speech.21  The 
Court concluded that the school board had the power to determine what 
type of speech was inappropriate in its schools22 and also that students in 
                                                 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 2624. 
14 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
15 Id. at 504. 
16 Id. at 505–06. 
17 Id. at 509. 
18 Id. at 506. 
19 Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
20 Id. at 677–78. 
21 Id. at 685.  In doing so, the Fraser Court distinguished the facts in Fraser from those in 
Tinker on the grounds that unlike Tinker, the penalties in Fraser were not related to a 
political viewpoint; accordingly, the First Amendment did not prevent the school from 
regulating Fraser’s speech under the belief that allowing such speech would undermine the 
school’s educational mission.  Id. 
22 Id. at 683. 
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public schools do not automatically enjoy the same constitutional rights 
as adults in other settings.23 
The Court’s decision in Kuhlmeier in 1988 restricted the freedom of 
speech and expression rights of students once again.24  In Kuhlmeier, a 
high school principal decided to delete two pages of the school-
sponsored newspaper that contained information he found to be 
inappropriate.25  The Kuhlmeier Court upheld the censorship of the 
student speech finding that students’ First Amendment rights are not 
violated when school officials exercise control over speech that is part of 
school-sponsored activities so long as school officials act in furtherance 
of legitimate educational concerns.26  The Kuhlmeier Court differentiated 
the central issue in Kuhlmeier from that in Tinker, noting that Kuhlmeier 
involved “promot[ing]” a particular student’s speech, not just 
“tolerat[ing]” it, thereby carving out another exception to Tinker.27 
Although Tinker created a definitive standard regarding when 
student speech could be regulated,28 the two decisions regarding student 
speech that followed, Fraser and Kuhlmeier, blurred the line.  Therefore, 
the Court granted certiorari in Frederick to determine whether the First 
Amendment prohibited a school principal from restricting student 
speech reasonably believed to promote illegal drug use.29 
                                                 
23 Id. at 682. 
24 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
25 Id. at 263.  The principal deleted the first article because he was concerned that it failed 
to properly protect the identity of the students about whom it was written and contained 
information that was inappropriate for younger students.  Id.  The principal deleted the 
second article because he believed that it failed to allow the parents of the child about 
whom it was written to consent to publication or respond to the commentary in the article.  
Id. 
26 Id. at 273. 
27 Id. at 270–71.  The Kuhlmeier Court reasoned that the question in Tinker was whether 
schools were required under the First Amendment to “tolerate” a particular form of 
student speech, whereas the question addressed in Kuhlmeier was whether schools were 
required to “promote” a specific student’s speech under the First Amendment.  Id.  In 
making this distinction, the Kuhlmeier Court determined that schools have greater authority 
to regulate the type of speech presented in Kuhlmeier to ensure the educational process is 
accomplished and students are not subjected to inappropriate material.  Id. at 271.  
28 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the Tinker Court’s reasoning). 
29 Frederick, 127 S. Ct. at 2625.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide two 
questions:  “whether Frederick had a First Amendment right to wield his banner, and, if so, 
whether that right was so clearly established that the principal may be held liable for 
damages.”  Id. at 2624. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION IN MORSE V. FREDERICK 
A. The Morse v. Frederick Opinion 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority in Frederick, began the 
opinion by first addressing Frederick’s claim that this was not a case 
about school speech.30  The opinion casually dismissed this claim based 
on the fact that when Frederick had displayed the banner, he was 
standing amongst fellow students during school hours at what was 
considered an approved social event or class trip.31  The opinion then 
examined possible interpretations that could be drawn from Frederick’s 
banner and concluded that it was reasonable to believe that the banner 
promoted illegal drug use.32 
The majority opinion then briefly analyzed each of its three prior 
decisions regarding student speech restrictions and the First 
Amendment—Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier.  The Court first 
acknowledged the principle established in Tinker that students do not 
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate.”33  Although the Court recognized the holding of 
Tinker—that school officials could not suppress student speech unless 
they reasonably concluded that such speech would “materially and 
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school[]”34—the 
Court distinguished the Tinker facts from those in Frederick, noting that 
Tinker involved political speech and that the speech at issue in Frederick 
was not political in nature.35  The opinion next considered the Court’s 
decision in Fraser, noting that the analysis used to decide Fraser was not 
clearly set forth by the Court; however, the Frederick Court did 
acknowledge Fraser’s two main principles:  (1) the method of analysis in 
Tinker is not absolute, and (2) students in public schools do not have all 
                                                 
30 Id. at 2624.  Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion joined by Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.  Id. at 2621.  Justices Thomas and Alito also filed concurring 
opinions.  Id.  Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part.  Id.  A dissenting opinion was also written by Justice Stevens in which 
Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined.  Id.  
31 Id. at 2624. 
32 Id. at 2625.  The Court found that Frederick’s sign could be interpreted as “[take] bong 
hits . . . [,]” “bong hits [are a good thing],” or “[we take] bong hits[.]”  Id. 
33 Id. at 2622 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
34 Id. at 2626 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513). 
35 Frederick, 127 S. Ct. at 2626.  The Frederick Court noted that Tinker was based on 
political speech and that political speech was “at the core of what the First Amendment is 
designed to protect.”  Id. (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003)). 
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of the same rights as adults have in other settings.36  Chief Justice Roberts 
then looked at Kuhlmeier and determined that even though Kuhlmeier was 
not controlling because Frederick’s banner could not reasonably be seen 
as being sponsored by the school, it was still significant because it 
demonstrated that schools could censor some speech even if the 
government could not censor the same speech in another setting.37 
The majority then relied on its prior decision in Veronia School 
District 47J v. Acton38 to demonstrate the important governmental interest 
in deterring illegal drug use by schoolchildren, primarily noting the 
damaging effects caused by such drug use.39  The majority also noted 
that the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994 
required schools to provide education for students about the dangers of 
illegal drug use.40  It is true that Tinker held that schools could not limit 
student speech merely because of “undifferentiated fear or apprehension 
of disturbance or a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”41  
However, the Frederick Court found that the school in Frederick acted 
within its authority by limiting speech pertaining to drug use because 
the goal of preventing drug abuse by students is much different than an 
attempt to avoid a controversial viewpoint, which was what occurred in 
Tinker.42 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion focused on ensuring that the 
Court’s decision would not be expanded beyond the facts of Frederick.43  
                                                 
36 Id.  Fraser established that the method of analysis in Tinker was not absolute and also 
that students in public schools did not necessarily have the same rights as adults in other 
settings.  Id. at 2626–27. 
37 Id. at 2627. 
38 Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).  Veronia involved a random 
urinalysis requirement for participation in interscholastic athletics.  Id.  In determining that 
this urinalysis requirement was not a violation of the students’ Fourth Amendment rights, 
the court considered the negative effects drugs have on young adults’ bodies as well as the 
fact that a person’s school years are the time when the effects of drugs are most severe.  Id. 
at 661.  The Court also found it was necessary for the state to act because it had undertaken 
a special responsibility to care for and provide direction for the children within its school 
system.  Id. at 662. 
39 Frederick, 127 S. Ct. at 2629. 
40 Id. at 2628.  See 20 U.S.C. § 7114(d)(6) (2002) (requiring schools that receive federal 
funds under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994 to certify their 
drug prevention programs and provide “an assurance that drug and violence prevention 
programs supported under [20 U.S.C. § 7114(d)(6) (2002)] convey a clear and consistent 
message that acts of violence and the illegal use of drugs are wrong and harmful[]”). 
41 Id. at 2629 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–09) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).  Justice Alito stated as follows: 
I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (a) it goes no 
further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2009], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/10
2009] Student Speech and the First Amendment 865 
Justice Alito emphasized that despite the special circumstances present 
in public schools, speech restrictions not already recognized by the Court 
are not automatically justified.44  Justice Alito reasoned that a “special 
characteristic” of the school setting must be present in order to restrict a 
student’s speech, and in this case, he determined this characteristic to be 
the threat of the physical safety of the students resulting from the speech 
advocating illegal drug use.45  Therefore, Justice Alito determined that 
public schools have the power to ban student speech promoting illegal 
drug use, but found this to be at the far end of the spectrum of what is 
permitted by the First Amendment.46 
The dissent, written by Justice Stevens, insisted that the school 
violated Frederick’s First Amendment rights, noting that the school 
board disciplined Frederick for his attempt to gain attention from the 
television cameras merely because Frederick’s sign made a reference to 
drugs.47  Justice Stevens reasoned that the First Amendment protects 
student speech when the message of the speech neither violates a rule 
nor expressly advocates conduct that is illegal and harmful to students.48  
According to Justice Stevens, the Court’s holding in Frederick allowed for 
viewpoint discrimination,49 thereby undermining the decision in Tinker.50  
                                                                                                             
reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use 
and (b) it provides no support for any restriction of speech that can 
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, 
including speech on issues such as “the wisdom of the war on drugs or 
of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use.” 
Id. 
44 Id. at 2637. 
45 Id. at 2638 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–09).  Justice Alito stated, “[D]ue to the 
special features of the school environment, school officials must have greater authority to 
intervene before speech leads to violence.  And, in most cases, Tinker’s ‘substantial 
disruption’ standard permits school officials to step in before actual violence erupts.”  
Justice Alito continued, 
Speech advocating illegal drug use poses a threat to student safety that 
is just as serious, if not always as immediately obvious.  As we have 
recognized in the past[,] and as the opinion of the Court today details, 
illegal drug use presents a grave and in many ways unique threat to 
the physical safety of students.  I therefore conclude that the public 
schools may ban speech advocating illegal drug use.  But I regard such 
regulation as standing at the far reaches of what the First Amendment 
permits.  I join the opinion of the Court with the understanding that 
the opinion does not endorse any further extension. 
Id. 
46 Id.  See supra note 45 (quoting from Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Frederick). 
47 Id. at 2643 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
48 Id. at 2644. 
49 Id.  See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(“When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers 
on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.”). 
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Justice Stevens also asserted that even though speech that encourages 
illegal drug use may increase the possibility that a student will 
experiment with illegal drugs, such speech does not necessitate 
censorship.51  Additionally, the dissent regarded Frederick’s banner as a 
“nonsense message, not advocacy[]” and found that because Frederick 
was simply attempting to get on television, he lacked the intent to 
persuade his audience to use illegal drugs; therefore, it was not 
reasonable to conclude he was advocating for drug use.52  For these 
reasons, Justice Stevens found that the Court created an unnecessary 
extension of power, allowing schools to censor any student speech as 
long as it is possible for someone to interpret that speech as containing a 
pro-drug message.53 
B. The Far-Reaching Scope of Morse v. Frederick 
Rather than clarifying the already confusing realm of student speech 
protected under the First Amendment, Frederick created more 
uncertainty and may effectively diminish students’ free speech rights.  
While the Court decided that a school principal could restrict student 
speech at a school event if the speech could reasonably be believed to 
promote illegal drug use, this ambiguous language has left room for 
interpretation.  Although Justice Alito concurred in the opinion, he 
recognized that the Court’s decision had the possibility of creating far-
reaching consequences on student speech.54  He focused on the threat 
that illegal drugs posed to the physical safety of children, whereas the 
majority opinion focused on the dangerous effects of drug use and the 
need to protect children in public schools.  Regardless of which of these 
two approaches is taken, Frederick established a standard that allows 
schools to increasingly attempt to restrict student speech. 
Because of the majority’s approach—articulating that schools can 
restrict student speech as long as the speech can reasonably be regarded 
as promoting illegal drug use—schools now have virtually unlimited 
discretion in prohibiting student speech relating to drugs.55  Giving 
schools this broad power creates situations in which students could be 
                                                                                                             
50 Frederick, 127 S. Ct. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
51 Id. at 2645. 
52 Id. at 2649. 
53 Id. at 2650. 
54 See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Alito’s concurring 
opinion). 
55 See The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 295, 300 (2007) 
(arguing that because schools are encouraged to create programs educating students about 
the dangers of illegal drug use, they view any messages that contradict their own message 
as encouraging drug use). 
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punished for innocent actions.  For example, a student who, during a 
school presentation about drug use, points out that a cited statistic or fact 
is inaccurate could be deemed as undermining the school’s anti-drug 
message and could therefore be reprimanded.56  Although the Frederick 
Court probably did not intend to allow schools to forbid such an action, 
Frederick’s “reasonably related” language likely allows schools to do so. 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, which focused on the threat of 
violence that illegal drug use poses to students, while attempting to limit 
the scope of the Court’s decision, still allows for the possibility of similar 
unintended consequences.  Because a number of other activities can also 
be interpreted as posing a threat of violence against students, such as 
banners or t-shirts encouraging students to skip school or engage in 
sexual activity, schools may also seek to censor this type of speech.57  
Therefore, despite Justice Alito’s attempt to prevent these results, the 
Frederick decision has created an opportunity for school officials to 
prohibit more types of student speech.58 
C. Morse. v. Frederick Allows for Viewpoint Restrictions 
The Frederick Court’s decision is flawed because it allows a school to 
engage in viewpoint discrimination in a public forum.59  It has long been 
held that government officials cannot discriminate against speech merely 
because of the content of the message.60  Frederick was disciplined 
because the principal interpreted Frederick’s banner as advocating illegal 
drug use and she disagreed with the message.61  Although students do 
not necessarily enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults enjoy in 
other situations, the Court failed to address that Frederick’s speech took 
place on a public sidewalk.  Although allowing the students to view the 
Olympic torchbearers as they passed by the school was an approved 
school activity that occurred during the school day, Frederick’s speech 
                                                 
56 Id.  See also Frederick, 127 S. Ct. at 2650 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that students 
everywhere could be punished for any comment if a reasonable observer could view it as 
promoting drugs). 
57 Erwin Chemerinsky, How Will Morse v. Frederick Be Applied?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 17, 21 (2008). 
58 Id. at 22.  Chemerinsky stated that he fears that principals, school boards, and lower 
courts will read Frederick as giving them more authority to punish student speech.  Id. 
59 Id. at 18. 
60 See supra note 49 (quoting Rosenberger regarding government speech in the context of 
viewpoint discrimination).  See also Chemerinsky, supra note 57, at 19 (indicating that the 
government should not be able to advance a particular position by silencing those 
individuals who hold an opposing view). 
61 Frederick, 127 S. Ct. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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still took place on a public sidewalk and not in a classroom or school 
auditorium.62 
Viewpoint discrimination is not allowed in a public forum, and yet, 
Frederick clearly upheld such discrimination.63  While slight viewpoint 
discrimination tolerance may be needed in the public school setting,64 
because Frederick’s speech took place outside of the schoolhouse and on 
a public sidewalk, a viewpoint restriction should not have been upheld 
unless it could survive strict scrutiny.65  Frederick was punished because 
his banner was interpreted as promoting illegal drug use.66  The Court 
justified this by acknowledging the school’s responsibility to educate 
students about the harmful effects of illegal drug use.67  However, 
Frederick was punished for the viewpoint he chose to express in a public 
forum; therefore, the school’s decision to punish Frederick contradicts 
the concept of the First Amendment.  By allowing viewpoint 
discrimination in Frederick the Court has created the possibility for school 
principals to exercise their power to punish students for any speech they 
do not like, especially when the speech is from students they may not 
like, thereby further limiting the freedom of speech and expression rights 
of students.68 
V.  CONCLUSION 
While the Frederick Court’s decision to restrict student speech once 
again is consistent with the Court’s two most recent decisions dealing 
with student speech—Kuhlmeier and Fraser—Frederick’s ambiguous 
language created an opportunity for schools to restrict student speech 
even further than the Court likely anticipated.  By determining that 
student speech could be censored if it could possibly be interpreted as 
reasonably relating to promoting illegal drug use, the Court created a 
standard whereby school officials could have the power to restrict 
student speech that had no intention at all of promoting illegal drug use.  
                                                 
62 Chemerinsky, supra note 57, at 19.  See Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115  (9th 
Cir. 2006), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (indicating that Frederick watched the torchbearers pass by 
from the sidewalk across the street from the school).  
63 Chemerinsky, supra note 57, at 19. 
64 Frederick, 127 S. Ct. at 2646 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
65 Chemerinsky, supra note 57, at 19. 
66 Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 at 2629 (indicating that Frederick’s speech was reasonably 
viewed as promoting illegal drug use).  See also The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading 
Cases, supra note 55, at 305 (stating, in regard to Frederick, that “[t]he school . . . explicitly 
decided to punish Frederick because of the perceived content of his speech, not because of 
the inappropriateness of his choice of time, place, or verbal medium[]”). 
67 Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 at 2629. 
68 Chemerinsky, supra note 57, at 25. 
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Moreover, because Frederick allowed for viewpoint discrimination, 
school officials may punish speech solely because they do not agree with 
it, which could create serious problems for courts. 
It is important to note that although both the Court’s reasoning and 
the standard established in Frederick were flawed, the outcome of the 
decision was appropriate.  School principals should have the power to 
restrict certain student speech, such as the type of speech Frederick 
engaged in, based on the circumstances surrounding the speech, 
regardless of whether the message was intended to promote illegal drug 
use or was merely a juvenile attempt to get on television.69  However, 
rather than focusing on the content of Frederick’s speech, the Frederick 
Court should have based its decision on the inappropriateness of 
Frederick’s actions considering the magnitude of the event in which he 
chose to display his message. 
 
Shannon L. Noder∗ 
                                                 
69 See Frederick, 127 S. Ct. at 2643 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[C]oncern about a nationwide 
evaluation of the conduct of the JDHS student body would have justified the principal’s 
decision to remove an attention-grabbing 14-foot banner, even if it had merely proclaimed 
‘Glaciers Melt!’”). 
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